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  In “What is Metaphysics?” Martin Heidegger claims that the fundamental 
mood of dread1 reveals the nothing. In this paper, I will focus primarily on the 
intentional structure of the mood of dread, and the claim that the mood reveals 
the nothing. First, I will give an overview of Heidegger’s account of the 
intentional structure of the mood of dread. I will then explicate S.J. Paluch’s 
objections to Heidegger’s conception of the mood of dread as intentional and to 
the claim that fundamental moods reveal. I will then respond to Paluch’s 
objections with Ronald Grimsley’s defense of the intentional structure of the 
mood of dread and what dread is said to reveal. 
 Heidegger asserts that fundamental moods reveal. He states that “the 
founding mode of attunement not only reveals beings as a whole in various ways, 
but this revealing—far from being merely incidental—is also the basic occurrence 
of our Da-Sein.”2 Here, Heidegger establishes the significance of fundamental 
moods– they are vital and inherent in Da-Sein.  Heidegger states that “[the 
fundamental mood of] anxiety reveals the nothing.”3 In order to explicate this 
claim, I will now briefly explain what the nothing is, according to Heidegger. He 
states that the nothing is “the complete negation of the totality of beings,”4 and 
argues that the nothing is incapable of being an object.5 What he seems to mean 
by this is that the nothing is a negating action —the nothing nihilates, and this 
nihilation is a sort of “repelling gesture” towards beings.6 
  Furthermore, Heidegger claims that in order for the nothing to be 
revealed, it would require its own fundamental mood—he introduces the 
fundamental mood of anxiety.7 Heidegger is careful to make a distinction between 
fear and the fundamental mood of anxiety. He does not intend for the mood of 
anxiety to be confused with common anxiousness or fear, he states that “anxiety is 
basically different from fear.”8 Heidegger asserts that when we are experiencing 
fear, it is directed at something; when we are in the mood of anxiety, anxiety 
cannot be directed at anything in particular. Recall that Heidegger argues that it is 
impossible to make the nothing into an object, and this impossibility is what 
prevents anxiety from being directed at anything in particular. Interpreted in this 
way, it seems as if the fundamental mood of dread has an intentional structure, 
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 notwithstanding its inability to be ‘about’ some thing in particular. If the 
fundamental mood of dread is to have an intentional structure it must be a type of 
intentional structure that is not able to take a particular object.  
 In his discussion of “What is Metaphysics?” S.J. Paluch directly criticizes 
a supposed intentional structure of the fundamental mood of dread. He begins his 
argument by attacking Heidegger’s claim that dread is always ‘of’ something, and 
that it reveals something that cannot be taken as an object (the nothing). Paluch 
concludes his argument by stating: 
I think we are forced to conclude that Heidegger both denies and 
affirms that dread is intentional (i.e. that ‘dread’ is always ‘dread 
of’ with the ‘of’ requiring a complement)… He denies the 
intentionality of dread in denying that dread has a target-object. He 
affirms the intentionality by treating the lack of a target-object as a 
target.9  
 
Paluch is not incorrect in questioning Heidegger’s account of the intentionality of 
dread, but he is incorrect in concluding that Heidegger simultaneously affirms and 
denies this intentionality. Although Heidegger makes it very clear that the nothing 
is not an object, this fact does not interfere with the intentional structure of the 
mood of dread. Paluch is especially incorrect in asserting that Heidegger denies 
the intentional structure of dread by denying dread a “target-object.” What Paluch 
seems to miss is that dread has an intentional structure, and in having such, 
attempts to take a target-object, regardless of the fact that the nothing wholly 
evades being taken as an object. 
 Furthermore, Paluch argues that the experience of “dread revealing the 
nothing” can be denied.10 He claims that Heidegger gives an incorrect description 
of the experience of the mood of dread, and then infers that the nothing has been 
revealed in the experience.11 Paluch gives an example to counter Heidegger’s 
claim that moods reveal: 
‘Jones is afraid of Smith and doesn’t know it’ is neither absurd nor 
implausible, yet ‘afraid’ is clearly intentional in this sentence. 
Jones may very well know that he is afraid (be victim to the mood 
of fear) and yet not know the object of his fear. The mood itself 
cannot be said to reveal its own object.12 
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 It is clear that Paluch is categorically wrong in his comparison. Recall that 
Heidegger draws a clear distinction between fear and the fundamental mood of 
dread. Paluch’s ‘fear’ cannot be considered an appropriate analogue to ‘dread.’ 
Furthermore, Heidegger argues that dread reveals the nothing—something that 
cannot be made into an object. Although it seems counterintuitive to assert that 
something that is nothing can be revealed, Paluch seems to miss this point when 
he asserts that the mood “cannot be said to reveal its own object”– the nothing is 
not an object that can be revealed qua object.   
 Ronald Grimsley takes a much more charitable stance on Heidegger’s 
account of the nature of the fundamental mood of dread. Grimsley explains the 
intentional structure of dread as such: “it is not dread of ‘this’ or ‘that’, but in the 
last analysis, of the ‘world’ as such, that is of a totality which cannot be defined as 
a mere aggregate of finite objects.”13 What Grimsley seems to mean here is that, 
the intentionality of dread is directed towards something that is difficult, if not 
wholly impossible to grasp as something that is not. This assertion seems to 
accept the intentional structure of dread, while remaining sympathetic to the 
difficulty in explaining how the intentional structure of the fundamental mood can 
be directed at something which is not anything.  
 Grimsley defends Heidegger’s claim that fundamental moods reveal. 
Grimsley argues that “the basic structure of human being” is “first revealed not 
through a process of intellectual analysis, but through certain ‘fundamental 
moods.’”14 Grimsley maintains that fundamental moods “point beyond 
themselves to the ontological aspects of man’s existence. The sense of ‘being 
there’ [Da-sein]…is revealed through the ‘key mood of dread.’”15 Grimsley’s 
interpretation of ‘being there’ being revealed in the fundamental mood of dread is 
likely founded on Heidegger’s assertion that “Da-sein means: being held out into 
the nothing.”16 
 Furthermore, Grimsley explains that “in the mood of dread, Nothing, as it 
were, presses itself upon man’s consciousness, forcing him to an awareness of 
himself as nothing (finite being-for-death).”17 It seems as if Grimsley’s 
interpretation of the mood of dread revealing is more tenable than Paluch’s denial 
of any revelation. Grimsley may not be entirely correct in exactly what dread 
reveals, but he is more sympathetic towards Heidegger’s claims than Paluch.  
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  In light of these preceding claims, perhaps we should assume that 
Heidegger was unclear or over simple in asserting that “anxiety reveals the 
nothing.” Perhaps Heidegger means to say that Da-sein is revealed in the 
fundamental mood of dread because it ‘hangs’ in the nothing, and can be 
differentiated from all particular beings. This is not to deny that the nothing is 
revealed in the fundamental mood of dread, but to suggest that maybe the nothing 
is not the only ‘thing’ that is revealed.  
 To conclude, Paluch’s arguments are founded on a misinterpretation of 
Heidegger’s claims. Paluch’s accusation that Heidegger both affirms and denies 
the intentional structure of dread seems to be founded on the strangeness of 
attempting to explain the nothing. Paluch’s argument that fundamental moods do 
not reveal is supported by an inappropriate analogy, and is therefore irrelevant. 
Grimsley’s interpretation seems to come closer to what Heidegger may be 
communicating; Grimsley is more supportive of the intentional structure of the 
mood of dread, and seems to understand the difficulty associated with talking 
about the concept of the nothing.  Grimsley’s assertion that the fundamental mood 
of dread reveals “the sense of being-there” may be more developed and accurate 
than the claim that “anxiety reveals the nothing.” 
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